11/7/2022 0 Comments Sentience definition philosophy![]() ![]() In these terms, consciousness is not the threshold of morality. In that case, standing on cats is not recommended. Defining morality as a system that tries to generate long-term positive experiences and to reduce negative experiences seems to work pretty well. Standing on a cat seems to produce deeply unpleasant feelings for the cat. Standing on a rock probably doesn't generate any observations - certainly not pleasant or unpleasant ones. I believe sentience is the bedrock of morality. Consciousness is a prerequisite: without internal observer, there is nothing to experience these feelings. A sentient entity is a system that can experience feelings, like pleasure and pain. ![]() Once again, I propose a more limited definition. Wiktionary has a definition for sentient that includes human-like awareness and intelligence. Wikipedia claims that consciousness is sentience. I think that is the unique ability of a conscious individual or system. Take the very core of that: not the intellectual observations connected to it, not the feelings associated with it, just the fact that a mental image exists. Hello, 'observer'! You probably have eyes. At this very moment, these words are being read. A conscious entity is a system with an "internal observer". "Consciousness" is often taken to mean "what we are". Sentience definition philosophy free#Feel free to propose different terms for the concepts below! Consciousness Clearly separating these terms makes it a lot easier to conceptualize a larger "spectrum of consciousness".ĭisclaimer: I expect some people to be upset for 'taking' terms and changing their definition. The words are often used interchangeably, causing people to think they are all the same or very closely related. Yet, I feel like there is no clear consensus about the meaning of those terms. I conclude by outlining the differences between vulnerability and sentience ascriptions: while sentience is a sufficient reason to ascribe moral status to a being, vulnerability draws our attention to those who are more likely to be denied what they are due.The terms in the title are commonly used in crucial debates surrounding morality & AI. I argue that many groups of animals currently qualify as particularly vulnerable and should be afforded special protection so that they receive what they are due. I explore the ethical implications of vulnerability ascriptions in three domains: livestock farming, animal experimentation, and animals living in the wild. By taking as my basis the definition of vulnerability presented by Martin, Tavaglione and Hurst, I demonstrate that some animals fulfil the conditions of vulnerability ascription. In a first step, I analyse the conditions of vulnerability ascription. Furthermore, I discuss the ethical implications of ascribing vulnerability to animals and I show what vulnerability discourse can add to debates on animal ethics. ![]() In this article, I investigate whether the concept of vulnerability, as it is currently used in bioethics, can be meaningfully extended to animals. While human vulnerability has been discussed for some time in the contemporary philosophy and bioethics literature, animal vulnerability has received less attention. ![]()
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